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HMCS Prince Robert: 
The Career of an Ar:med 
Merchant Cruiser 
C.R. Shelley 
Introduction 
H MCS Prince Robert was one of three identical ships used as armed merchant cruisers 
(AMCs) by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) during 
the Second World War. On the eve of war, Canada 
had but six modern destroyers, with no prospect 
of additional ships for some time. To fill the 
desperate need for escorts, the Naval Service 
clutched at Prince Robert and her two sister liners 
as an expedient in a time of crisis; yet, by war's 
end she would be one of the most sophisticated 
ships of the RCN. Much like the citizen sailors 
who manned her, she signed up for the duration, 
saw service worldwide, and returned to civilian 
life much changed by the experience of war. 
The career of the Prince Robert shows quite 
effectively the changing roles of the AMC during 
the Second World War and the vital niche that 
these ships filled. This account of the Prince 
Robert has three main objects: to detail the 
genesis of the AMC in its Canadian context; to 
explain the roles and missions that AMCs were 
expected to fulfil; and, to show how the Prince 
Robert, as an example of her class, fulfllled them. 
Further, the story of the Prince Robert's war 
service, in Canadian waters and abroad, sheds 
light on the policies of the Naval Service, how the 
RCN handled the technical challenges of the 
widening war, and how it cooperated with allied 
navies. For the Prince Robert was unique among 
RCN ships: after her initial conversion, she was 
radically refitted twice; her mission changed 
totally in the middle of the war; and, she was the 
most travelled of any RCN vessel. If for no other 
reason, these facts make her noteworthy. 
The Genesis of Canada's AMCs 
H MCS Prince Robert was classed as an armed merchant cruiser (AMC). An AMC is simply 
a fast liner that is requisitioned and armed by 
the government in wartime for naval service, 
manned by a naval crew. Its usual duties are to 
patrol trade routes, convoy merchant ships, and 
intercept warships that may be engaged in 
commerce-raiding against friendly shipping. The 
conversion of liners to AMCs frees regular 
cruisers to support fleet actions and to patrol the 
more dangerous shipping lanes, in that order of 
priority. An AMC is a cheap way of rapidly 
increasing the number of surface units available 
to the navy as escorts. 
Long before Canada had a navy the Admiralty 
saw her as a possible source of AMCs. At the First 
Colonial Conference, 4 April to 9 May 1887, Sir 
Sandford Fleming, eager to promote the strategic 
value of the new Canadian Pacific Railway, offered 
that, "any fast mail steamers which the Canadian 
Pacific might in future operate across the Pacific 
would be available for use as armed merchant 
cruisers in time of war." 1 At the 1909 Imperial 
Conference, L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and 
Fisheries, proposed the conversion of merchant 
ships to AMCs as an expedient for local defence. 
The Admiralty rejected the idea, possibly in the 
hope that Canada would create a real navy. 
However, in 1911, Sir William White, a former 
Director of Naval Construction for the Admiralty, 
(1885-1902) made an unofficial visit to the Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Borden. He discussed naval 
policy with Borden and suggested that Canada 
could contribute to the common defence by 
subsidizing suitable large mail steamers of speeds 
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HMCS Prince Robert. in the Georgia Strait, shortly after her 1943 refit. (NAC PA 147131) 
greater than 18 knots for use as AMCs during a 
war. Subsidization would permit the government 
to approve the plans before the ships were built, 
to allow for the incorporation of a stiffened 
structure for mounting the guns. These ships 
would protect Canadian commerce and trade 
routes while the Royal Navy husbanded cruisers 
for the inevitable large fleet actions with Germany. 2 
The scheme resembled today's American Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet, which subsidizes a number of 
civilian jumbo-jets with large cargo-loading doors 
and stiff floors that can accommodate outsize 
military cargo in times of need. 
Although Borden seems to have been warm 
to the idea, and even mentioned it in a cable to 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, 
on 22 March 1913, the endeavour collapsed with 
the failure of the Naval Aid Bill in the Senate. 3 
Nonetheless, the Admiralty did arm three 
Canadian Pacific liners, the Empress of Asia, the 
Empress of Japan, and the Empress of Russia 
as AMCs during the Great War. 4 
48 
Not surprisingly, the issue of AMCs surfaced 
again during the interwar period. Commerce 
raiders, such as the German cruiser Emden, had 
met with some success during the Great War, and 
the Admiralty assumed that such a threat would 
recur in any future conflict. In 1927 the Admiralty 
requested the Under Secretary of State for the 
Dominions to gain Canada's agreement for the 
pre-positioning of guns and other stores in 
Canada sufficient to arm four AMCs on the west 
coast. Their proposed employment was "to 
prevent American contraband trade with Japan," 
in the event of a war between the Empire and 
Japan. 5 Similar proposals were made to Australia 
and New Zealand. Pre-positioning would give the 
Dominions the capability to press AMCs into 
service long before a similarly converted ship, 
dispatched from Britain, could arrive on station.6 
Canada accepted the proposal, which cost very 
little, (storage only) and over a ten year period 
the Admiralty laid down the appropriate arms 
and equipment. 7 
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By 1932 the Canadian government began to 
give some slight attention to the Naval Service, 
and to the War Book, wherein some "suitable 
government and privately owned vessels were 
earmarked as auxiliaries," should the need arise. 8 
As the decade progressed, and the war clouds 
loomed darkly on the horizon, the government 
considered the question of Canada's naval defence 
more seriously. In 1935, the Chief of the Naval 
Staff, Commodore Percy Nelles, assessed the 
naval threat to Canada for the Minister for Naval 
Services. Nelles foresaw possible raids on 
shipping by enemy AMCs, submarines, or 
possibly light cruisers, and he proposed a 
minimum force of six modem destroyers as a 
defence. 9 However, the idea of converting 
Canadian ships into AMCs for the RCN, was not 
far from his mind. 
The Prince Robert as an AMC 
T he ships that had caught the eye of the Naval Service were three ordered in 1929 by 
Canadian National Steamships from the Cammell 
Laird shipyards, Birkenhead, Scotland. CN 
named them Prince Robert, Prince David, and 
Prince Henry, not after royalty, but as a 
counterpoint to Canadian Pacific's Princess fleet. 
Purchased at a cost of over $2,000,000 dollars 
in 1930, the Prince Robert was a small liner of 
6,893 tons gross displacement, 385 feet in length. 
She was capable of 23 knots, but at a more sedate 
15 knots she had an endurance of 6, 000 miles. 
Her three decks made her a fairly high ship, and 
her cargo spaces, car storage and staircases 
meant that she lacked the watertight integrity 
desirable in a ship of war. Nonetheless, she and 
her two sisters were the most suitable Canadian 
registered ships available for conversion to 
AMCs. 10 Nelles moved twice, in 1937 and again 
in 1938, to prevent their sale to foreign shipping 
interests in order to keep them in Canada. 11 Nelles 
also ensured that the War Book provided for 
gaining the authority from the Privy Council to 
requisition such ships. 12 
When the Second World War broke out, the 
Admiralty asked the Naval Service to arm certain 
British registered liners as AMCs, using the stocks 
deposited in Canada during the 1930s. Work 
commenced 3 September 1939 on SS Letitia at 
Montreal, and on the P & 0 liner Rajputana at 
Esquimalt. The conversion was rapid, with HMS 
Letitia sailing on 25 November, and HMS 
Rajputana sailing on 29 December. 13 In all, the 
Admiralty requisitioned 51 liners as AMCs, 
representing 773,000 tons of the fmest passenger 
shipping in the British Empire. 14 All, save one, 
were large ships, in the 11,000 to 22,000 ton 
range. 15 Conversion was straightforward. 
Shipyards removed as much inflammable 
material as possible, and installed ballast, 6-inch 
guns, and a rudimentary fire-control system. 
However, the result was a high-sided, fast rolling 
gun-platform, from which accurate gunfire was 
very difficult. 16 As the master of the liner SS 
Transylvania remarked after she was taken into 
RN service, "[a) merchantman must always be an 
indifferent fighting ship, however gallant the men 
who man her. "17 
Canadian plans for the Prince ships were 
more ambitious than a simple modification. The 
naval staffs plans called for removing the liners' 
top three decks, fitting a light cruiser 
superstructure, and mounting four 6-inch guns 
along the ships' centre-line. 18 As Canada owned 
neither the guns nor the equipment for the 
conversion, Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) 
signalled the Admiralty proposing to draw guns 
from pre-positioned stocks. 19 The Admiralty 
agreed to the conversion of the ships in short 
order. 20 By 3 September 1939, an Order-in-
Council gave the Naval Service the authority to 
requisition ships, and on the 19th, the War 
Appropriations Act approved $10,000,000 for the 
first shipbuilding programme.21 At first the Naval 
Service had wanted to charter the ships, but as 
the scale of the modifications required became 
apparent, it decided to buy the ships outright, 
and in December 1939 negotiated with CN for 
their purchase. The haggling went on for some 
time, but finally they agreed upon a price of 
$700,000 for the Prince Robert. 22 
SS Prince Robert was taken in hand at 
Burrard Dry Dock, Vancouver on 9 February 
1940. The shipyard ripped apart the luxurious 
lounges of the upper decks where King George Vl 
and Queen Elizabeth had strolled during their 
transit from Victoria to Vancouver the previous 
May. In their place came a light cruiser 
superstructure, four 6-inch Mk.VII guns on 20 
degree mountings, two 3-inch high-angle (HA) 
Mk.I anti-aircraft guns, two Lewis guns, and 
49 
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four .5-inch machine guns. 23 A rudimentary fire 
control system was installed, as was service 
accommodation for 22 officers and 219 ratings. 24 
The first of the three AMCs fmished, HMCS Prince 
Robert was commissioned on 31 July 1940, at a 
cost of$755,300.25 
The AMCs, stripped of their civilian finery, 
daubed with grey and armed with ancient guns 
in odd positions, faced a life that was potentially 
quite short. The Admiralty expected German 
surface raiders to attack British shipping, using 
their 'pocket-battleships' of the Deutchsland 
class, cruisers, and disguised armed merchant 
raiders. Therefore, the Admiralty sought to 
prevent the escape of German surface forces into 
the Atlantic by patrolling the exits, and in 
particular the northern exits between the Faeroe 
Islands and Iceland, and the Denmark strait. 26 
The Admiralty manned this "northern patrol" with 
AMCs of the Royal Navy, and although these large, 
fast liners filled the gap during a time of desperate 
need, they paid the price before the guns of the 
German navy. Scharnhorst sank HMS 
Rawalpindi on 23 November 1939, Admiral 
Scheer sank HMS Jervis Bay on 5 November 
1940, and U-boats accounted for eight AMCs in 
1940 alone. 27 Nor could the cost be measured 
solely in terms of ships lost. By official estimate, 
the conversion of liners caused Britain to forego 
one and a half to two million tons of imports 
before the fall of France, and the AMCs had the 
potential of transporting 100,000 troops at a time 
when troopships were at a premium. 28 Yet, one 
can hardly fault the Admiralty for failing to foresee 
the fall of France or the need for American troops 
to cross the Atlantic. In 1939 I 40 the conversion 
of liners to AMCs provided desperately needed 
ships to close the gaps in the patrol lines. 
The prospect of an armed merchant raider 
appearing in the waters off Canada's Pacific coast 
concerned the RCN in 1940, and HMCS Prince 
Robert was expected to combat this threat.29 
These raiders bore the outward appearance of 
merchant ships, but they mounted five modem 
5.9-inch guns, torpedo tubes, and a scouting 
aircraft, carefully concealed behind painted 
canvas screens. 30 They carried sufficient flags and 
fake superstructure to mimic up to three or four 
neutral ships on the Lloyd's register, allowing 
them either to pass as harmless, or else come 
within close range of their quarry without being 
50 
suspected. They were deadly fighters, for their 
modern guns ranged 20,000 yards as against 
14,200 yards for anAMC. So it was that the raider 
Thor sank the AMC HMS Voltaire on 4 April 1941, 
after thrashing HMS Alcantra and HMS 
Carnarvon Castle in 1940.31 Even proper fighting 
ships were vulnerable; the cruiser HMAS Sydney 
managed to sink the raider Kormoran on 19 
November 1941 near Perth, Australia, but was 
herself sent to the bottom with the loss of all 
hands. 32 
In the fall of 1940, HMCS Prince Robert 
remained the only RCN ship available to protect 
shipping on the west coast. The threat of raiders 
occupied her there for almost the next two years. 
Fortunately for Canada, and Prince Robert, 
German raiders were unlikely to roam as far as 
the west coast when there were easier pickings to 
be found elsewhere. US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's order of 5 September 1939, creating 
a Neutrality Patrol and a Pan-American Neutrality 
Zone in the waters surrounding the United States 
and South America, influenced German 
deployments. Although raiders did enter the zone 
on occasion, they generally stayed clear, on 
instructions from Hitler.33 Thus, Canada's west 
coast became an isolated and constricted hunting 
ground, and the Germans stayed away. 
If raiders posed little threat in the immediate 
vicinity of the west coast, their presence in the 
Pacific was still problematic. The Admiralty chose 
to keep a strict watch on German supply ships in 
neutral ports as one means of combatting the 
raider threat. These supply ships had taken refuge 
in neutral ports at the onset of war. On receipt of 
a coded message they would sally out and 
rendezvous with a raider. One such ship was the 
Weser, sheltering in the Mexican port of 
Manzanillo, waiting to re-supply the raider 
Orion. 34 In September 1940, the Commander-in-
Chief America and the West Indies requested that 
NSHQ sail Prince Robert to patrol offManzanillo 
and intercept the Weser. The Commanding Officer 
Pacific Coast (COPC) ordered Prince Robert to 
sail forthwith. 
Since commissioning under pennant number 
F56 on the 31st of July, the Prince Robert had 
been at Esquimalt, and had barely started her 
work-ups. She did one trial shoot with her 6-inch 
guns on 11 September, then headed south to 
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Mexico in what her captain, Commander C.T. 
Beard, RCN, called, "a very unready state. "35 She 
was aided by a minor piece of deception: a fake 
story planted by Naval Intelligence in the Seattle 
edition of the Vancouver Sun stating that Prince 
Robert would not be out of refit for some time. A 
Nazi agent in Seattle obligingly wired the 
information to the captain of the Weser in 
Manzanillo. 36 Sure enough, on the night of 25 
September the Weser sortied, and due to some 
skilful seamanship Prince Robert surprised her 
right outside the three mile limit. The Prince 
Robert fired but one shot, a starshell, and seized 
the freighter so quickly that her crew made no 
attempt to scuttle or burn the ship. The Weser's 
captain later told Commander Beard that he had 
thought Prince Robert was only a Mexican coast-
guard cutter, and so was taken unawares. It was 
a glorious start to Prince Robert's career. 
It is just as well that no fighting took place, 
for Prince Robert's armament was desperately 
inadequate. Nominally, the three Prince ships 
were the most powerful units in the RCN. 
However, their 6-inch guns were 40 years old, 
having been salvaged from the casemates of 
scrapped King Edward class battleships, while 
the Great War vintage 3-inch HA guns were of little 
use against modern aircraft. 37 Problems With the 
6-inch armament were common. The guns in "A" 
and "B" turrets sometimes failed to run-out after 
firing, and in 1941 the captain, Commander Hart, 
RCN, complained that "A" gun could not be trained 
without the assistance of at least five ratings 
pushing against the muzzle. 38 On another 
occasion the recoil mechanism on a 3-inch HA 
gun failed due to metal fatigue. 39 Unfortunately, 
the years of governmental neglect could not be 
made up overnight, and as a result more modem 
armaments were simply not available in Canada 
in 1940-41. So Prince Robert sailed on as she 
was, toiling away on west coast escort and patrol. 
The remainder of 1940 and the spring of 1941 
saw Prince Robert patrolling off the South 
American coast on Admiralty orders and Visiting 
various neutral ports to keep an eye on the 
German shipping bottled by the British blockade. 
At the request of the New Zealand Naval Board, 
Prince Robert was assigned in the spring of 1941 
as an escort for SS Awatea, which was bringing 
airmen from Australia and New Zealand to 
Canada for the British Commonwealth Air 
Training Plan. 40 Prince Robert refitted at 
Esquimalt during the summer of 1941, and in 
October joined up once again With Awatea to 
carry the ill-fated Royal Rifles of Canada and the 
Winnipeg Grenadiers to Hong Kong. On the return 
trip, Prince Robert cleared Pearl Harbour three 
days ahead of the Japanese attack, never 
approaching closer than 500 miles to the 
Japanese fleet. COPC sent them word of the 
calamity at 114 7 hours 7 December 1941.41 
The entry of the Japanese into the war gave 
new impetus to the problems of west coast 
defence. NSHQ despatched HMCS Prince David 
to Esquimalt immediately, and HMCS Prince 
Henry followed Within five months. By May 1942, 
west coast naval strength stood at three AMCs, 
three corvettes, five minesweepers, and three 
armed yachts. 42 HMCS Prince Robert entered a 
minor refit in February 1942. The addition of 
asdic for the detection of submarines, splinter 
matting for protecting the bridge, SW1-C radar 
for surface warning, and four hand served 20 mm 
Oerlikon guns for close-in anti-aircraft defence 
brought her complement up to 24 officers and 
302 men. 43 With these changes NSHQ considered 
her suitable for coastal patrol duties. 
NSHQ harboured no illusions about either the 
threat or the fighting value of the AMCs. NSHQ 
assigned the ships the following tasks:" ... first, 
to provide objectives which are vital to our war 
effort With efficient close protection; and second, 
to provide mobile forces capable of proceeding 
with the utmost dispatch to any threatened 
point."44 However, another mission statement put 
a high value on a visible presence: 
1. To guard focal shipping points in the 
Northeast Pacific, particularly off BC. 
2. To patrol sheltered waters where enemy 
vessels might hide along the coast. 
3. To reassure the public by their presence in 
the absence of any other warships. 
4. To obviate American pressure on sparse 
Canadian naval forces in the area. 
5. To make credible publicized threats against 
the enemy.45 
The Naval Service hoped that the sight of three 
large, impressive looking, Canadian warships in 
the Straits of Georgia off Vancouver would calm 
the public's fears of a Japanese attack. They could 
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do little else. By the end of 1941 the German 
surface raiders had shot their bolt and were no 
longer a threat. The three Princes, barely adequate 
against a raider, certainly had little potential with 
their ancient guns against units of the Japanese 
Imperial Fleet. Yet, they still fulfilled a useful 
political, vice operational role for Canada. 
Fate, and the eagerness of the COPC, 
intervened to fmd Prince Robert more challenging 
duties. Japan seized the Aleutian islands ofKiska 
and Attu in June 1942, and it did not take the 
Americans long to prepare their riposte. Prince 
Robert's role in the affair would be both the 
occasion for a minor controversy and the catalyst 
that brought about her second career. At a June 
naval conference in San Francisco, COPC 
(Commodore Beech, RCN) had been asked by US 
General De Witte if the RCN could provide any 
assistance for the upcoming operation against 
Kiska. COPC had held out the possibility of anti-
submarine patrols, but made no promises, nor 
did he inform NSHQ, preferring to wait for the 
visit ofthe Chief of the Naval Stafffrom 4-10 July 
in Esquimalt. They discussed the matter, COPC 
suggesting that the Princes and two corvettes 
might be offered up, to which the CNS agreed in 
principle. Nothing more was heard until the USN 
naval liaison officer raised the matter on 15 
August; then, on 16 August, the US Commander 
North-West Sea Frontier signalled: 
How many escort and anti-submarine vessels 
are you willing to spare for Alaska project? 
Desire ships report 20 August at Kodiak .... 46 
Due to the short notice, COPC issued sailing 
orders immediately, informing NSHQ after the 
fact. 
Mr. Angus MacDonald, Minister for Naval 
Services, informed the Cabinet War Committee 
of COPC's actions on 26 August, noting that, " .. .it 
was conceived to be part of[COPC's] duty to be 
of assistance, where possible, to American 
forces. "47 Indeed, this was generally so; however, 
Commodore Beech had exceeded the provisions 
of the North American defence plan ABC-22. 
Canada's first anti-aircrcift ship. at a British naval base. January 1944. (NAC PA 163947) 
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Although it was not discussed at the meeting, 
ABC-22, Section IV, Task Four, paragraph 21, 
"Defend Alaska and Protect Its Sea 
Communications within the Coastal Zone," had 
the sub-task in paragraph 25, "Canada, Navy-
Provide sea transport. Protect sea 
communications in the Canadian Coastal Zone. "48 
The task COPC had agreed to was clearly beyond 
the Canadian Coastal Zone. The Prime Minister 
was perturbed, and remarked that, "Commanding 
Officers must understand that the Minister 
concerned, and ultimately the War Committee, 
had final responsibility in matters of this kind. "49 
Equally irritating was that NSHQ had experienced 
great difficulty in getting any information from 
the Americans about their plans or the enemy 
forces involved. 50 There was one last telling 
comment before the committee passed on to 
weightier matters. The Minister for Naval 
Services," ... stated that it had been pointed out 
on his instructions specifically to the US 
commander that the Canadian AMCs were not 
regarded as real fighting ships suited for this 
duty."51 
Whether suitable or not, Prince Robert 
proceeded directly to patrol off Kodiak on 17 
August. For three months she endured ghastly 
weather, fog, and treacherous currents while 
escorting convoys from Kodiak to Dutch Harbour. 
While Prince Robert was engaged in this 
demanding and necessary work, the future of the 
three Prince ships was being decided in Ottawa 
and London. 
HMCS Prince Robert as an Auxiliary 
Anti-Aircraft Ship 
T he day of the armed merchant cruiser in the Second World War was now over. Escorts 
were available in sufficient numbers such that it 
was no longer justifiable to risk these large, 
valuable ships with their puny armaments on the 
open ocean. Of 51 AMCs, by 1943 fifteen had been 
sunk, 26 converted back to troopships, and the 
remainder retained in other duties. 52 For Canada's 
Prince ships, the question of new roles and new 
armaments had been a topic of discussion 
between the Admiralty and NSHQ. After 
considering an Admiralty offer of four slightly 
newer Mk.XII 6-inch guns for each vessel, NSHQ 
declined, preferring to mount lighter, quick-
firing guns. NSHQ chose a configuration of five 
twin 4-inch HAlLA mountings capable of eighty 
degrees of elevation. The advantages over the 
old 6-inch mountings were numerous: greater 
range, a heavier broadside due to the higher 
rate of fire, and most importantly, the guns were 
effective against aircraft. 53 
The Admiralty had accepted the idea of 
arming escorts with twin 4-inch HA/ LA mountings 
with some reluctance. Senior naval officers 
favoured the larger 4.7-inch guns which gave 
hitting power for surface actions. But at Narvik 
German dive bombers had easily beaten the 40 
degree mountings of Tribal class destroyers, and 
since the fall of France and the extension of 
German air cover over the Western Approaches, 
aircraft and U -boats had eclipsed surface forces 
as threats. 54 The Admiralty's change in armament 
doctrine became apparent in HMS Lance, an L 
class destroyer completed in 1941 with 4-inch 
HA/LA mountings. She proved extremely 
successful in both HA and LA roles.55 Arming 
Prince Robert with five twin 4-inch mountings, 
suitable secondary armament, and a modem fire 
control system would make her an extremely 
powerful anti-aircraft escort. 
Canada's Naval Board decided on conversion 
of the three Princes in September 1942.56 Its 
proposal to arm the ships with five twin 4-inch 
mountings, suitable secondary armament, and a 
modern fire-control system reflected not only the 
ascendancy of the air threat, but the RCN's desire 
to find a useful role for the ships. The Admiralty 
finally settled the matter in January 1943, by 
officially requesting that one Prince ship (Prince 
Robert) be re-equipped as an anti-aircraft ship, 
and the other two as Landing Ships Infantry 
(Medium). 57 All would be used under RN control 
in Europe. 
Prince Robert began her conversion at 
Burrard Drydock, Vancouver, in February 1943. 
NSHQ chose the west coast dockyard as it was 
much less pressed for work and labour than east 
coast dockyards, and had better access to 
materials. Burrard executed the modifications 
specified in the Admiralty plans with 
commendable skill, using Canadian workers. 
They machined gun platforms for five Mk.XIX HA/ 
LA mountings, each boasting twin 4-inch Mk.XVI* 
guns. It was truly a Canadian production: the 
53 
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Pift view of HMCS Prince Robert in 1943. The three twin 4-inch gun mountings 
qf the ajt group are clearly visible. (NAC PA 145618) 
mountings were made in Trenton, Ontario; the 
guns were the first 10 off the line from Sorel 
Industries, Sorel. Quebec; and the fuse-setting 
machinery was made by Reliance Gear Works in 
Vancouver, B.C. Secondary armament consisted 
of two 4-barrel, 2-pounder Mk.VII pom-poms, and 
six 20 mm hand-operated Oerlikon guns. The 
installation of a Rangefmder Director Mk. V, a Fuse 
Keeping Clock Mk.III*, a Fire Control Box Mk.II, 
a Gyro Roll Corrector Mk.VII, and an Automatic 
Barrage Unit Mk.I provided Prince Robert with a 
relatively sophisticated fire control system. Radar 
information came from a 272 Mk.III Surface 
Warning set, a 285 gun-ranging set, and a SW2-C 
radar set. The SW2-C was a modified version of 
the Canadian SW1-C that incorporated an 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) function capable 
of discerning friendly vessels or aircraft from 
unfriendly ones. 58 The ship's complement 
mushroomed to 33 officers and 405 ratings. 59 
With the exception of building Tribal-class 
destroyers, the refit of the Prince Robert was 
54 
probably the most complex task undertaken by 
a Canadian shipyard during the war. 
Prince Robert was recommissioned on 7 June 
1943 as an auxiliary anti-aircraft ship, and after 
work-ups sailed for England, reaching the Clyde 
in mid-August. For the next year Prince Robert 
was under the operational control of the RN, 
employed as an anti-aircraft escort on the UK-
Gibraltar run, and in the Mediterranean. She 
added a powerful anti-aircraft defence to any 
convoy she escorted, but this power came at a 
price. The new armament meant that Prince 
Robert was now top heavy, displacing 7, 243 tons, 
and riding 3 feet 8 inches below her designed 
deep loading marks. Without the water-tight 
division of a fighting ship, she was sure to capsize 
quickly, if damaged. 60 
NSHQ signalled the Admiralty in early August 
authorizing them to make any additions or 
alterations necessary for fighting efficiency. As a 
result, a team from the RN Gunnery School, HMS 
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Excellent, inspected the ship. 61 They reported 
Prince Robert to be generally well fitted out and 
efficient, but made several recommendations 
with respect to radar, armament, and fire 
control. 62 By no means were all of these 
implemented, but the British replaced the 
Canadian SW2-C radar with a 291 air warning 
unit; they installed two type 242 IFF sets and 
an Air Plotting table; and, they installed six 
additional Oerlikon guns, giving a total of seven 
for each side. Her captain, Captain A.M. Hope, 
RCN, considered that, allowing for work-ups, 
Prince Robert would be ready for action by 18 
October 1943.63 
Prince Robert's time of testing would soon be 
upon her. Allied naval and air forces had soundly 
defeated the U-boats in the North Atlantic and 
the Bay of Biscay during the summer of 1943. 
This defeat brought on some belated cooperation 
between the Luftwaffe and the U-boats in the Bay 
of Biscay during the months of September 
through November, as the German Navy 
Commander, Admiral Doenitz, sought to regain 
the offensive by attacking convoys on the UK-
Gibraltar run. It was these very convoys, passing 
through the Bay of Biscay, which Prince Robert 
was tasked to defend. 
The Luftwaffe threw two new weapons into 
the fray, in the form of the Hs293 radio-controlled 
glider bomb and the SD1400Xradio-controlled 
bomb, better known as the 'Fritz-X'. The former 
had a 1,000-pound warhead for use against 
merchant ships or unarmoured escorts, while the 
latter had a 3,000-pound warhead to pierce the 
decks of armoured warships.64 In May 1943, 
Admiral Doenitz had advocated using the new 
weapons in a mass-attack on Gibraltar sometime 
after June 1943, when sufficient numbers had 
been stock-piled. Hitler considered such a move 
impractical due to the difficulty in overflying Spain 
and security concerns should one fall into Allied 
hands. Instead, he ordered the weapons to be 
used to make up the shortfall in sinkings by 
U-boats.65 German aircraft could only reach the 
Bay of Biscay convoy routes, yet, in what can only 
be considered a piece of ineptitude on the part of 
the Luftwaffe High Command, the Hs293 was fed 
into the battle piecemeal. On 27 August 1943, 
the Tribal-class destroyer HMCS Athabaskan 
was the first to suffer, when Do-21 7 bombers of 
Kampfgeschwader (KG) 100 hit her with an 
Hs293 glider bomb. A frigate, HMS Egret, blew 
up after being hit by a glider bomb during the 
same attack. 66 Despite these successes, the 
Luftwaffe was not prepared to follow up its 
advantage. The Do-217 was only an interim 
carrier for the weapon, and the Luftwaffe awaited 
the arrival of the new HE-1 77 bomber before 
renewing the aerial offensive. 67 On 25 October 
1943, KG 40 arrived in south-west France at 
Bordeaux-Merignac, equipped with HE-177 I A5 
aircraft capable of carrying the Hs293.68 The 
Prince Robert was soon to meet them in battle. 
In mid-November Doenitz threw his forces 
into combat against a 66-ship convoy, SL139/ 
MKS30, that was proceeding from Gibraltar to 
England through the Bay of Biscay. On the 16th, 
as they sailed about 200 miles southwest of Cape 
St. Vincent, under escort by seven ships of the 
40th Escort Group, a long-range FW -200 
reconnaissance aircraft sighted them. Doenitz laid 
three successive patrol lines of U-boats across 
their path. By 18 November the battle had been 
joined, and the U -boats got the worst of it. For 
the next three days, SL139 /MKS30 battled its way 
homeward. German losses were high: HMS Exe 
sank U -333 on the 18th; a 179 Squadron 
Wellington sank U-211 on the 19th; HMS Nene, 
HMCS Calgary, and HMCS Snowberry sank 
U -536 on the 20th; and HMS Foley and HMS 
Crane sank U-538 on the 21st. 69 The British 
suffered damage to HMS Exe, which had left one 
propeller embedded in the hull of U -333 after 
ramming her; the sloop HMS Chanticleer lost her 
stern to an acoustic torpedo, but struggled back 
to the Azores; and, U-boats shot down two anti-
submarine aircraft on the 21st. 70 
It had been the Admiralty's practice to have 
Prince Robert sail from her base at Plymouth to 
escort convoys between England to Gibraltar, and 
vice versa. After several uneventful convoys the 
Admiralty ordered Prince Robert into Plymouth 
on 19 November for repairs to her asdic dome. 
After putting much of the crew ashore on leave, 
the Captain received an order at 1900 hours from 
Western Approaches Command to make ready 
to sail immediately in support of SL139 /MKS30. 
A mad scramble ensued to both round-up the 
crew and repair a leak in number 3 boiler, but by 
0400 hours on the 20th Prince Robert had cleared 
Portsmouth harbour, southbound for the Bay 
of Biscay. 71 
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The Luftwaffe struck SL139/MKS30 at 
1527 hours, 21 November when 20 HE-177 
aircraft of KG 40 attacked with glider bombs. 72 
FW-200 aircraft joined in with high level 
bombing. The Germans dropped glider bombs 
at intervals of 4 to 5 minutes, and at 1558 hours 
a glider bomb hit and mortally damaged the 
M.V. Marsa. The escorts, reinforced to 22 ships, 
engaged the aircraft with gunfire. Prince Robert 
arrived as the attack was developing and took 
her normal station astern of the convoy, 
opening fire immediately. 73 The attackers 
released sixteen glider bombs during the battle, 
twelve of which seem to have been directed 
against the straggler, M.V. Marsa.74 The Prince 
Robert engaged three separate HE-1 77 aircraft 
making attacks on the convoy, damaging one, 
and preventing it from launching its weapon. 
The HE-177s released their weapons at 14,000 
yards range and 7,000 feet altitude. Mter the 
bomb fell from the aircraft, its rocket motor 
ignited, accelerating it to 370 miles per hour. 
The rocket cut out after 12 seconds. whereupon 
the bomb dove down at a 45 degree angle 
towards its target. The operator in the launching 
aircraft guided the bomb, placing the bomb and 
the target on the aircraft's port side. The bomb 
then flew at low level, about 50 feet, as the 
operator tried to manoeuvre it into the side of 
the ship. With an impact speed of approximately 
450 miles per hour and a 1 ,000-pound 
warhead, a hit from an Hs293 was deadly. 75 
Prince Robert was fortunate in arriving just as 
the battle commenced. Had German 
reconnaissance planes spotted an anti-aircraft 
ship with the convoy, the attackers would 
doubtless have concentrated on sinking her as 
a first priority. 76 Her timely arrival seems to have 
surprised them. 
Prince Robert engaged the HE-177 control 
planes with her 4-inch armament, firing 333 
rounds in all. At one particularly tense moment 
a glider bomb headed towards the Prince Robert, 
and was engaged by the short-range armament. 
Fortunately, it passed close by Prince Robert and 
achieved a near-miss on a merchant ship 1,000 
yards away on the tail of the convoy's port 
column. 77 The Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant-
Commander R.I. Hendy, later recalled that he had 
difficulty getting radar ranges for the HE-1 77, 
as the radar operator tended to track the glider-
bomb instead. 78 
56 
The attack ceased at 1705 hours. The 
results tallied as follows: one ship badly 
damaged and abandoned, one ship damaged 
but seaworthy, and one escort damaged; as 
against three German aircraft shot-down, (two 
by a patrol plane), and three damaged. 79 The 
volume and accuracy of the anti-aircraft fire 
from Prince Robert and the few frigates of the 
escort appears to have disconcerted the 
attackers. By the same token, the ability to use 
a "stand-off' delivery kept the aircraft casualties 
low, considering that only one aircraft was lost 
to anti-aircraft fire. Nevertheless, the ships got 
through. The escort forces of SLl39/MKS30 
won a clear victory over the combined aerial 
and U-boat forces of the Reich. As S.W. Roskill 
stated in The War At Sea, "[t)he victory of the 
sea and air escorts had indeed been resounding, 
and the long-awaited co-operation of the 
Luftwaffe with the U-boats had not achieved 
the results hoped for by Doenitz. "80 When the 
Luftwaffe tried again, on 26 November, to attack 
another convoy off Bougie, it lost four HE-177s 
during the action and another three from forced 
landings. Daylight attacks on shipping were 
henceforth abandoned. 81 
For Prince Robert the duty of escort continued 
on, taking her along the convoy routes to 
Gibraltar, and into the Mediterranean during 
1944. As she went about her uneventful, but 
important, routine, plans were being made in 
London and Ottawa which would see her refitted 
once more, and sailing in yet another theatre of 
war, the Pacific. As early as November 1943 the 
Admiralty considered refitting Prince Robert as a 
Flagship for an Escort Carrier Force to be sent 
to the Pacific, but decided against it due to her 
lack of armour and the lack of time in which to 
effect the necessary radar upgrades. 82 
Nonetheless, the expectation that Prince Robert 
would be refitted was firmly fixed in the 
Admiralty, and once refitted the only logical place 
to employ her was the Pacific. 
* * * * * 
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HMCS Prince Robert: Anti-Aircraft 
Cruiser for the Pacific 
R e-fit.ting the Prince Robert as an anti-aircraft cru1ser for deployment to the Pacific theatre 
required a considerable leap in sophistication for 
her fire-control, radar, and communication 
systems. The gunnery inspection report of HMS 
Excellent and the earlier message from NSHQ 
authorizing the Admiralty to make any additions 
and alterations necessary for efficiency had 
provided the initial shove which had got the idea 
of another refit in motion. Ships officers spoke 
directly to RN authorities about further changes 
to Prince Robert, and the RN assumed on its part 
that these conversations were official requests 
from the RCN, which they were not. 83 Thus, when 
the Admiralty proposed, at a meeting of the 
Canadian Joint Staff Mission with the British 
Chiefs of Staff in London on 19 May 1944, that 
Prince Robert be part of the Canadian 
contribution to the Pacific, they did so on the 
assumption that she would be extensively 
refitted. 84 On 11 October 1944 the Cabinet War 
Committee decided Prince Robert would go to the 
Pacific.85 The RCN was not opposed to the refit, 
but believed that the Admiralty had done all the 
staff work. NSHQ discovered, to its chagrin, that 
the plans drawn up by the Director of Naval 
Construction (RN) at Bath were not Admiralty 
approved, and that no Staff Requirements had 
been raised for the refit. The Director of Naval 
Construction at NSHQ lamented that, "as the 
Prince Robert was to all intents and purposes a 
RN ship ... " the RN should have raised the Staff 
Requirements. 86 He then pointed out the 
deficiencies of the Prince Robert with respect to 
top weight and lack of watertight division. His 
final comment was, "[t]he procedure which has 
led to the present conversion shows that divided 
control between Admiralty and NSHQ is 
unsatisfactory, and that in future the 
responsibility for A[dditions] and A[lterations], 
etc., for RCN ships under RN administration must 
HMCS Prince Robert arrives in Esquimault, B.C. carrying Canadian personnel liberated 
from Japanese prisoner-of-war camps, 20 October 1945. (NAC PA 116788) 
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remain with NSHQ."87 DNC's frustrations were 
understandable; they stemmed from having to 
delay the completion of two Tribal-class 
destroyers in order to prepare the paperwork and 
drawings for Prince Robert. 88 
Administrative difficulties aside, there was an 
obvious need for a modem anti-aircraft cruiser if 
the RCN was to fight Japan. In September 1944, 
Prince Robert returned to Canada, and on 20 
December was paid off into refit at the Burrard 
Dock in Vancouver. There she was fitted with an 
Action Information Office roughly equivalent to 
that of a modern destroyer, a combined 
Operations and Bridge plotting table, a simplified 
Air Directing room for fighter direction, and a host 
of new radar equipment. A barrage director and 
automatic barrage unit were fitted aft for the 
control of the aft 4-inch guns. Perhaps the most 
significant omission was that of Remote Power 
Control for the main guns, which would have 
allowed the director to train the guns remotely. 89 
The main armament remained ten 4-inch 
Mk.:XVI* guns in twin HA/LA mountings, but 
secondary armament changed to two power-
operated quadruple pom-poms, two power-
operated twin 20 millimetre Oerlikons, five single 
Oerlikons, and four 40 millimetre power-operated 
Boffin guns. All Oerlikon and Boffm guns featured 
gyro-stabilized reflector sights, similar to those 
employed in fighter aircraft. 90 When 
commissioned on 4 June 1945, Prince Robert 
was outgunned only by the RCN's new cruisers, 
Uganda and Ontario. Unlike the cruisers, 
however, Prince Robert was a Canadian effort. 
As fate would have it, Prince Robert arrived 
in the Pacific too late to see any action against 
Japan. Her captain, Captain W.B. Creery, RCN, 
represented Canada at the surrender ceremonies 
in Hong Kong, and the ship had the ironic task of 
transporting former prisoners of war from Hong 
Kong back to Canada. Once home, there was no 
question of keeping Prince Robert in service. Not 
only did she lack the speed to keep up with the 
fleet carriers, cruisers and destroyers of the RCN's 
post-war dream navy, but the inadequacies of her 
merchant hull, with its lack of watertight division, 
and her excessive topweight, made it 
unconscionable to keep her in service as a fighting 
ship. Prince Robert was paid off to War Assets 
for disposal on 18 January 1946.91 
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Back to Civvy Street 
Prince Robert's conversion into an AMC for the RCN in 1940 had been in line with sixty years 
of naval thought which saw the conversion of fast 
liners into armed ships of war as a partial solution 
to the problem of Canada's naval defence. 
Canada's failure to acquire the guns and 
equipment necessary to execute even the modest 
plan of converting three ships had put NSHQ in 
the embarrassing position of asking permission 
of the Admiralty to use the weapons that had been 
put aside for British ships. That Prince Robert 
never met an armed foe during her duty as an 
AMC was fortunate, indeed, for her armament 
was obsolete and unsuited to the task of hunting 
down and destroying raiders. It was only when 
rearmed as an anti-aircraft ship that she took her 
rightful place in the fighting line of the RCN. 
The carriers, cruisers, and fleet destroyers 
of the post -war RCN faded relatively quickly from 
the scene, but Prince Robert left a legacy. When 
Canada's Tribal-class destroyers refitted in the 
1950s, their 4.7-inch mountings were removed, 
and in their place were the 4-inch HAlLA guns of 
an anti-aircraft ship. Prince Robert served on in 
civilian life until 1962, when, as SS Lucania, she 
was scrapped by her Italian owners. Like so many 
wartime ships, she went unnoticed at the end. 
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